Zimbabwe to the rescue in the Congo?

Posted by Jackson On 9:56 AM 0 comments
Robert Mugabe attends the presidential inauguration of Joseph Kabila, December
20, 2011. Gwen Dubourthoumieu/ AFP. 
It is August 1998, the dawn of the Second Congo War. After a daring 1,000 mile-plus airlift, Rwandan and Ugandan troops stand at the western outskirts of Kinshasa, poised to topple the newly instated regime of Laurent Kabila. Zimbabwean and Angolan troops come to the rescue, beating back the invaders. Zimbabwean troops will play a key role for the remainder of the war, grinding down the more conventional Rwandan/ Ugandan/Congolese rebel advance from the east.

Once again rebels with (according to the UN [November 15 Group of Experts Report 
 and November 26 letter with supplementary info]) Rwandan and Ugandan backing are wreaking havoc in eastern DRC. They have threatened to march on Kinshasa, and judging by the performance of the Congolese army (FARDC), it seems only time and jungle stand in their way. Will Zimbabwe bail out Kabila Jr.? Not likely.

A November 23 article in the Zimbabwe Independent reports several ZANU-PF sources as nixing another Zimbabwean military intervention in the Congo.

Since Zimbabwe withdrew its troops from the Congo in 2002, Joseph Kabila has faced numerous challenges, and talk of Zimbabwean military involvement has continued to surface. Rumors have circulated that a detachment of Zimbabwean presidential guards protects Kabila, and some analysts interpreted comments made by Robert Mugabe during Congo’s post-election turmoil in 2011 as a willingness to intervene militarily on the side of Kabila should the need arise.

However in regards to this newest threat, it seems certain the government of Zimbabwe will not bail out Kabila as it did from 1998-2002. History provides the reasons.

Mugabe, who had grown increasingly insecure over magnitude of his regional clout, intervened in the Second Congo War primarily to prove himself as a still relevant force in southern African geopolitics. Patronage opportunities for members of his inner circle likely also played a roll. While these goals may have been achieved, the operation proved to be an albatross in almost every other way.
Zimbabwean troops disembark at N'Djili airport,
Kinshasa, 1998. BBC. 
ZANU-PF officials had intended the expedition to be self-sustaining, financed by a web of immense mining, timber, land and other economic concession granted to Zimbabwean parastatals and military run holding companies. While various organizations have criticized the deals as allowing for the large-scale exploitation of DRC’s natural wealth, the Zimbabwean Defense Forces proved incapable of such exploitation. The various projects required significant start-up costs and technical expertise that the ZDF did not posses, and shadowy partners brought to provide funds and know-how got the best of every deal (see Jason Stearns’ Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, and this International Crisis Group report). While individual ZANU-PF and ZDF commanders likely made some quick cash Zimbabwe’s foreign war grew the nations debt.

The financial burden of the intervention mixed with ZANU-PF’s disastrous economic policies lead to the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy in the early 2000s.

The war was deeply unpopular with the Zimbabwean public. It was a rallying point of the MDC during the 2000 legislative elections, through which the opposition party burst onto the political scene with a surprisingly strong performance.

The same circumstances mitigate against another Zimbabwean intervention today. Zimbabwe can little afford another military adventure, and the DRC is in no better position to pay for one either. In fact, Zimbabwe is still trying to claim US$1 billion from Kinshasa for expenses occurred during its last Congo campaign. With economic troubles and other problems at home, another intervention would likely prove just as unpopular. Additionally, elections loom in 2013.

The Zimbabwe Independent also cites the breakdown of relations between Kabila and Mugabe. Kabila has apparently not shown enough gratitude for Mugabe’s vital support – refusing to pay the war debt while distancing himself from Mugabe’s pariah regime and cozying up to South Africa.
However, a Zimbabwean government source noted the possibility of Zimbabwean intervention within SADC, AU and/or UN frameworks. Here, it seems that Zimbabwe would be covered politically and, most importantly, would not have to foot the bill. 


South Africa, Angola and Nigeria announced that they are putting forward Nigeria’s well-known and well-respected finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, as a candidate for President of the World Bank. Ngozi’s nomination marks the first time a US nominee for the Bank’s presidency will face a serious competitor, and the first serious challenge the developing world has mounted against the global North’s command of the World Bank and IMF.

In the past, the developing world has been unable to rally behind viable candidates from amongst their ranks. When Dominique Strauss-Kahn stepped down as head of the IMF Mexico put forth its highly competent finance minister, Augustin Carstens, as a candidate. Despite his stellar credentials Carstens’ nomination gained only the support of Uruguay in Latin America, and faired little better in other regions. 

Thus the consensus of South Africa, Angola and Nigeria on Ngozi’s candidacy is a breakthrough. The three nations are three of Africa’s most important financial and geopolitical players. Together they wield the most power of any Sub-Saharan nations in the World Bank, jointly electing a single Executive Director who sits on the Board, while the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa elects only two Executive Directors. South Africa is strategically placed as a BRIC country to lobby persuasively for that grouping’s support, which South Africa’s finance minister said he would do at a BRIC summit next week.

Brazil wants to nominate another highly qualified emerging market finance minister, Columbia’s Jose Antonio Ocampo, for the job. However, Columbia might scuttle Ocampo’s nomination. A Columbian already heads the Inter-American Development Bank, and Columbia has said it wants to focus on its Vice President’s bid to head the International Labor Organization, a much more attainable goal than the World Bank presidency. If Ocampo is not nominated Ngozi would have an easier time uniting the developing world behind her candidacy.

Ngozi candidacy remains a long-shot. The US controls the most votes within the World Bank, and can almost certainty count on the support of the EU, Japan and several of the other largest vote holder’s within the Bank. Yet even if Ngozi does not become president, there are positives to take away from the above developments. On a continent where unity is oft called for and sorely needed, South Africa, Angola and Nigeria have proven that collective action can be taken. And the fruit of that action - the challenge of Ngozi’s candidacy - will likely pressure on the Obama administration to respond with the nomination of an exceptional candidate that can compete with Ngozi for support in the developing world.

Niger's Oil Boom Already Disappointing

Posted by Jackson On 8:31 PM 0 comments

The past two years have provided positive developments for Niger - the fall of a dictatorial regime followed by internationally lauded elections, increased Uranium mining and strong rates rates of economic growth. Unfortunately, despite improvement in such significant political and economic indicators, serious problems plague Niger.

The Nigerien terrain’s ever-tenuous ability to provide enough grain has been taxed of late by decreasing rainfall and overpopulation, resulting in three food crises in the past seven years. Prices of scarce domestic foodstuffs and costly imports teeter at prohibitively high levels. Adding to Niger’s food insecurity is the high price of fuel, which like food and almost everything else in Niger, must be imported. Recent depreciations of the Euro, on which Niger’s currency is pegged, have worsened the situation by driving up the price of imports.

Thus China National Petroleum Company’s 2008 discovery of oil in Niger appeared to offer some relief to average Nigeriens juggling high food and fuel prices. CNPC estimated that 350 million barrels lay underneath Niger’s Agadem field, and the company signed a deal with the Nigerien government to explore and develop Agadem, construct a refinery in Zinder and build a pipeline connecting the two sites. With production beginning this year at 12,000 barrels per day (bpd) and working up to 100,000 bpd in 2018, the Agadem field and the Zinder refinery could easily cover the 7,000 bpd that Niger consumes, eliminating the need for costly imports. With both the Nigerien and Chinese governments touting the deal as bringing fuel-self-sufficiency to Niger, Nigeriens envisioned drastically lower fuel prices and an easier burden to bear.

However, after the Zinder refinery went online in November the government announced only a modest decrease in fuel prices, from 679 CFA francs to 570 CFA francs for gas and from 655 CFA francs to 577 CFA francs for diesel. Nigeriens were upset, and political activist and opposition politician Aboubacar Mahamadou organized protests that marred the Zinder refinery’s opening ceremony on November 28th. The protests intensified after Aboubacar was arrested, and two protesters were killed by gunfire from police.

Speculation has ensued over why the price of fuel has remained high. Several government spokesmen have stated that stockpiles of more expensive imported fuel must be sold-off before the cheaper domestically produced fuel can be sold. However other reports state that the construction cost of the Zinder refinery has forced the Nigerien government to keep prices high. Under the terms of the contract singed in 2008 between the CNPC and Niger, the refinery was to be constructed at a price of $600 million, however the CNPC has billed Niger for the amount of $980 million, citing unforeseen difficulties with the geography of the building site.

Questions remain as to the justification for the Zinder refinery going $380 million over-budget. Jeuneafrique has reported that no feasibility study was done on the construction of the refinery prior to the signing of the contract, but was only done a year after. Additionally a UNDP audit of the project was of the opinion that CNPC’s surcharges were spurious, and advised the Nigerien government not to pay the full amount. Niger has subsequetly announced that it will carry out its own audit. The results of the audit will be important for the future of Niger, its oil industry and its relationship with China.